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The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914

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the officer's situation as well as the "veil of tears" that covers both domestic and international politics.

The suggestion that programming the minds of military professionals with the wisdom of humane letters can result in the triumph of good, simply overstates (even the potential) impact of literature on national security outcomes. The particular literature that describes Don Quixote tilting at windmills should be required reading for those who would use good ideas to dilute the evil in reality. We already know that needs to be done. We do not know how to do it and this little book fails to give us even the slightest hint.

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Schurman, D.M. *The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914*. Malabar, Fla.: Krieger, 1984. 213pp. \$15.50

Don Schurman's *Education of a Navy* is so well known and so highly regarded by practicing naval historians that the occasion of its reprinting does not require an extensive review, except to draw attention to the fact that it is happily available once more.

Originally published in 1965, it is the pioneer work of scholarship which outlines the intellectual *milieu* in which naval theory took shape. In a series of essays—on the two Colombbs, Mahan, Richmond, Laughton, and Corbett—Schurman defines the contributions of

the men who not only changed the study of naval history from an antiquarian and patriotic pastime to a serious academic study, but who also founded the basis for professional thought through the use of history. The book remains an important part of every naval historian's library and should be read by everyone who has an interest in the development of naval theory.

Krieger has reprinted the book without any revision to the text, but important progress has been made in the field with Schurman's own 1981 book, *Julian S. Corbett: Historian of British Maritime Policy from Drake to Jellicoe* and his article, "Mahan Revisited" (*Swedish Journal of Military History*, 1982). In addition, Barry Hunt's study, *Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond* (Waterloo, Ontario, 1982) has greatly improved and refined knowledge of Richmond's contribution. The recent appearance of these works makes Schurman's earlier book all the more valuable as the basic study in the area.

Professor Theodore Ropp has written a preface to the Krieger reprint in which he appropriately hails Schurman's book as "the classic study of the intellectual change from sail to steam." Regrettably, the printer omitted five words in Ropp's preface, at the bottom of the first page. It should read: "What the current head of the [Canadian] Royal Military College's History Department was dealing with two decades ago was the policy maker's over-all mentality as he dealt with a glorious

but vanished past, a confusing present, and a future which looked even more ominous as the Victorian and Bismarckian Empires drifted into a future war which Mahan's contemporary, the Polish, Jewish banker and economist Ivan S. Bloch saw as one of technical, economic, and political disaster." Ropp suggests that the situation is similar to our own. With that in mind, the early efforts which Schurman describes can make profitable reading for those who ponder the best method for educating naval policymakers in a period of rapid change.

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Reynolds, Clark G. *Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires*. Malabar, Fla.: Robert E. Krieger, 1983. 2 volumes, 646pp. \$19.50 each

There may well be those who will argue with some of the theses and points of view expressed in Clark Reynolds' *Command of the Sea*, but few of them will be professional naval officers. This wide-ranging and encyclopedic study was first published, as a single volume, by William Morrow of New York in 1974, when one reviewer called it "one of the most scholarly and important volumes on Sea Power since E. B. Potter and C. W. Nimitz" It now reappears in a two-volume format, revised and updated, with the very useful maps of the original offered in a small separate booklet.

Clark Reynolds is one of the best-known of serious American naval

historians. He studied under Theodore Ropp at Duke University—to whom his book is dedicated—and he has taught at the US Naval Academy and the University of Maine, as well as lecturing at the Canadian Forces Staff College in Toronto and elsewhere. He is now at the naval museum at Patriot's Point in North Carolina.

Command of the Sea is an ambitious project. Reynolds says, "all maritime states and non-maritime-centered peoples who have plied the sea must be analyzed historically and strategically if seapower is to be appreciated, understood, and applied in the future," and this analysis is what he then embarks upon. There is a good bit of modernized Admiral Mahan lurking in these pages, and one is reminded of Secretary Stimson's remark that whenever he entered the Navy Department he felt as if he were in a realm where "Neptune was God, Admiral Mahan his prophet, and the U. S. Navy the one true church." Thus Reynolds maintains that seapower, true thalassocracy, is a mix of national homogeneity, geographic and strategic situation, political liberalism, capitalistic economics, dominance of a middle class, religious toleration, intellectual freedom, and a disposition toward a navy rather than an army. He claims there have really only been four of these—classical Athens, Venice during the Renaissance, the seventeenth-century Netherlands, and more recently Great Britain. He would like to add the contemporary United States, but regretfully decides that it does not